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Abstract
We look at the relations between two third-party actors involved in violent conflict
situations: international peacekeepers and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in
an ethnopolitical conflict site (i.e. Bosnia). We link the peacekeepers contact with NGOs
(frequency and importance) to successful conflict resolution styles. We further link the
peacekeepers choice of conflict resolution style to occurrence of problems between
NGOs and peacekeepers. We also examine the moderating effects of training and
perception of preparedness for the peacekeeping mission on the relationship between
frequency of contacts with NGOs (cooperation with NGOs) and conflict resolution with
NGOs. We develop hypotheses based on the literature on third party intervention and
conflict (Jehn, 1997, Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998, Zartman, 1995, Rupesinghe, 1995,
Herausberger, Calliess & Merkel 1995), cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1973),
training ( Dupre, 1976, Pruegger & Rogers, 1994). We test our hypotheses on survey
data from a sample of Dutch military peacekeepers on missions between 1995 and 1999
in Bosnia (N = 907). Implications for cooperation and effective intervention on that part
of peacekeepers and NGOS in real conflict situations are discussed.
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Successful Conflict Resolution Between Peacekeepers and Local NGOs: A Role of
Training and Preparation for Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia

Introduction
International intervention in intra-state war has been a feature of the international system
over the last decade and still continues. Beginning with Iraq in the 1991 until Sierra
Leone in 2001, the United Nations (UN), and other international institutions such as
North American Treaty Organization (NATO) and ECOMOG as well as individual states
(for example, Britain, South Africa) have sent military peacekeepers into situations of
conflict. Belying their name, these peacekeepers have actually been mandated or
sometimes forced to create peace, instead of merely inhibit the recurrence of violent
conflict between warring parties. It is in such a situation that the subject of our study, the
Dutch contingent of NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force
(SFOR) troops, found themselves in Bosnia in 1995.
Another common feature of international intervention in complex humanitarian
emergencies, as events such as Bosnia have come to be known, is the rapid mobilization
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), both international and in some cases,
national, at the scene of conflict. These NGOs provide critical resources, material and
human, and intervene to prevent even greater civilian casualties and the collapse of social
services to those in need. They also work to lay the grounds for future peace and
development. Therefore, both NGOs and peacekeepers, co-exist in the same
“humanitarian space.” As such, the mandates of peacekeepers and NGOs have begun to
overlap and can sometimes result in competition over scarce resources. This is one of the
first papers that specifically examines this overlap of NGOs and peacekeepers in Bosnia.
Furthermore, for successful intervention in conflict and peacebuilding, it is necessary for
the NGOs and peacekeepers to work together. For example, sometimes NGOs need the
protection of peacekeepers in order to move personnel and material to needy areas. At

other times, peacekeepers need the good relations and information of NGOs to provide
protection to civilians and encourage resettlement by refugees and the internally
displaced. In such a situation, it is critical to examine both the successes and failures of
peacekeeper-NGO interactions as it affects their mutual interests and effectiveness.
Therefore, our focus is to elucidate the nature of the interaction between these major third
party actors. Specifically, we examine the frequency and importance of contacts between
NGOs and peacekeepers in Bosnia. We choose these criteria due the increasing numbers
and importance of NGOs in conflict zones which leads to inevitable contact between the
two third-parties. For example, in Bosnia, during the midst of the crisis in 1993, the
number of NGOs doubled from 65 to 126, of which 91 were international and 35 were
local (Weiss, 1999).
For NGOs, the fact remains that their ability to gain donations and grants is directly
related to their ability to be where there is most need, and that does not always match
peacekeeping priorities. For example, when military peacekeeping objectives dictate
overt influence and try withhold assistance to persuade local parties to cooperate, NGOs
may provide succor and assistance, and restrict the effectiveness of peacekeepers
conditionality (Flint, 243). However, in some situations NGOs have been useful to the
implementation of peacekeeping operations. For example, in Bosnia, the NATO IFOR
and SFOR troops were asked to promote cooperation on the ground by using the leverage
of NGOs to create civilian supports to the General Framework Agreements for Peace
(Flint, 233). Peacekeepers in almost all situations of conflict, will therefore have to learn
to manage relations with NGOs.
Recent literature on peacekeeping operations, however, (ex. the UN’s Brahimi Report)
has tended to concentrate on the structures, mandates, staffing, etc. of peacekeeping
operations. Critique at the level of interaction and implementation in coordination with
other international third-party actors in intra-state conflict is still quite limited. Likewise,
the literature on NGOs emphasizes coordination and principles, such as “do no harm”
(Anderson, 1999) that govern NGO-local party relations in situations of conflict, but
rarely examines the competing interests that come into play when dealing with other

third-party actors, such as peacekeepers. However, we argue that the commonalities and
differences in the activities of NGOs and peacekeepers, results in cooperation and
competition and it is crucial therefore, to take a closer look at those activities as they can
have a detrimental effect on the missions of both.
Another reason for closely examining NGO-Peacekeeping relations and the ability to
resolve conflicts among themselves is their common third party status. This is privileged
due to common perceptions of impartiality and neutrality. Differences in how NGO
workers and peacekeepers present and act upon this shared identity in a conflict situation
affects both players. In extreme cases, mishandled conflict can result in putting one or the
other party in danger. Impartiality means nothing to local warring parties when a Red
Cross Nurse and a UN Commander use the same word to describe a medical program and
air strikes, respectively. (Slim, 127).
Civil-military cooperation units (CIMIC units) are specific units within peacekeeping
forces that work with NGOs, and international organizations such as the World Bank,
UNHCR, etc to resolve such issues. For example, in Iraq, there was one center for
coordination between the military operations and the NGOs on the ground. The belief
was that information sharing in real time avoids competition between the international
intervening parties. However most armies do not have specialized CIMIC units or the
resources and time to set up specific cooperation centers. Flint states that in Bosnia, the
late arrival by CIMIC troops meant missed opportunities in terms of coordinating policy
with NGOs. Thus, training regular troops in cooperation and conflict resolution,
management and communication becomes important when the odds and necessity of their
being placed in peacekeeping operations has increased considerably in the last decade.
Hence, we focus on the examining the specific role of training. Organizational culture
differences between the military and civilians, functional relevance and competition, and
cross-cultural interactions between peacekeepers and NGO actors can contribute to
conflict between the two third-parties, and these can be decreased by various training
programs.

This paper might help to influence the way future peacekeeping missions are designed
and how peacekeepers are trained to work with NGOs on the ground, in a successful
manner. And though it does not examine the influence of such cooperation on the warring
parties, the assumption is that greater cooperation between the two third-party actors will
produce greater combined effectiveness, efficiencies in resources and better results in
implementing peacekeeping operations in the future.

Research model and definitions
We look at the relations between two third-party actors involved in violent conflict
situations: international peacekeepers and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in
an ethnopolitical conflict site (i.e. Bosnia). The classical conception of peacekeeping
envisages a military force intervening between two conflicting parties who have agreed to
a cease-fire. Increasingly, peacekeeping missions undertake a variety of tasks, such as
civil administration, policing, monitoring and human rights enforcement (Leeds, 2001).
Moreover, as in Bosnia, peacekeepers intervene in non-negotiated, non-cease-fire
situations. As the Brahimi Report states, “ UN operations thus did not deploy into post
conflict situations but tried to create them.” italics in original (Brahimi Report, UN,
2001). Therefore, we define peacekeeping as a military force intervening in a conflict
situation. And we define NGOs as international and/or national non-governmental
organizations.
We link the peacekeepers contact with NGOs (frequency and importance) to successful
conflict resolution styles. We define conflict resolution style based on five conflict
management modes that describe interactant’s characteristic types of conflict
participation (Blake & Mouton, 1964). These are forcing, confronting, integrating,
avoiding, and compromising (Dallinger & Hample, 1995). We link the peacekeepers
choice of conflict resolution style to occurrence of problems between NGOs and
peacekeepers. See Figure 1 for the research model.

We also examine the moderating effects of training and perception of preparedness for
the peacekeeping mission on the relationship between frequency of contacts with NGOs
(cooperation with NGOs) and conflict resolution with NGOs. We define training as a set
of educational activities offered by an organization to peacekeepers to promote awareness
about cross-cultural differences and to improve individuals’ skills in communicating with
others of diverse backgrounds. Many of the common peacekeeping functions and
activities require cultural sensitivity self-awareness, basic communication, negotiation
and mediation skills (Leeds 2001).
We develop hypotheses based on the literature on third party intervention and conflict
(Jehn, 1997, Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998, Zartman, 1995, Rupesinghe, 1995, Merkel 1995),
cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1973), training ( Dupre, 1976, Pruegger &
Rogers, 1994). We test our hypotheses on survey data from a sample of Dutch military
peacekeepers on missions between 1995 and 1999 in Bosnia (N = 907).
The potential contributions of this paper is that it is one of the first studies that
investigates the relationship between NGOs and peacekeepers and how coordination
between these parties can affect the mission. We have collected a unique data set that
provides rich quantitative and qualitative information on this subject to draw valid
conclusions and inform future studies. Second, although general accounts of lack of
coordination and competition exists, prior empirical evidence is lacking. Therefore, we
add to the field by providing an empirical test of the NGOs-peacekeeping contacts.
Finally, in this paper we look specifically at the moderating effect of training, which also,
to our knowledge, has not been empirically tested in previous research.
Hypotheses:
Contacts between social units reduces intergroup conflict, and members of different
groups start interacting more intensively/frequently, and so develop positive sentiment
over time. This increased cohesion leads to cooperation and intensive information
exchanges among peacekeepers and NGOs (Deutsch, 1973, Nelson, 1989). We argue that

this information exchanges will enhance the behaviour repertoire of peacekeepers and
provide a positive response in terms of a broader range of conflict management strategies
that are successful. For example, literature on information and decision-making provides
empirical evidence that greater information exchange leads to the generation of better
choices (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Therefore we predict:
Hypothesis1 (H1): The more frequent interaction and the more important
the interaction between Peacekeepers and NGOs, the more effective their
conflict resolution style.
Based on the conflict resolution literature and conflict management, effective conflict
management style (for example, compromising, integrating) will result in greater trust
and confidence and will enhance peacekeeper-NGO cooperation (Lewicki & Stevenson,
1997; Murnighan, Malhotra & Weber, 2001). This is likely to lead to less competition,
creation of barriers, and less depletion of resources and energy. Finally, less perception of
problems between the two parties will result (Deutsch, 1973, 1977).
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The more effective the Peacekeepers conflict resolution
style the less problems they will experience in their daily interaction with
NGOs.
We base our rationale for the moderating effect of training on the literature on
experiential groups and cross-cultural training. Specifically, research on experiential
groups (T-groups) implements the concept of “action research” to solve social problems
(Dupre, 1976). Researchers (Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick, 1970) suggest that
training similar to T-group training heightens egalitarian attitudes by promoting better
understanding of self and others, increasing sensitivity to others, and fostering tolerance
to the others’ behavior. We argue that this tolerance will lead to better understanding
between two parties and will promote cooperation and sensitivity towards the other.
Along these lines, research on cross-cultural training (CCT) explains how CCT helps
people adjust to a new culture (Pruegger & Rogers, 1994). Different training models are

offered to improve trainees’ ability to interact effectively with individuals from another
culture (Black & Mendenhall, 1990; Fiedler, Mitchell, & Triandis, 1971; Harrison, 1992).
Evidence for the effectiveness of CCT programs has shown a predominantly positive
impact. Therefore, we predict that preparedness & training will influence the relationship
between frequency and importance of contact with NGOs and successful conflict
resolution styles.
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The Peacekeepers perception of their preparation for
the mission will moderate the relations between frequency and importance of
contact of Peacekeepers with NGOs and conflict resolution styles: That is,
when Peacekeepers strongly perceive that they are well prepared, the
positive relationship between the frequency and importance of contacts
between the two parties and effective conflict resolution will become more
positive.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The Peacekeepers training for the mission will
moderate the relations between frequency and importance of contact of
Peacekeepers with NGOs and conflict resolution styles: That is, when
Peacekeepers are well trained, the positive relationship between the
frequency and importance of contacts between the two parties and effective
conflict resolution will become more positive.
Based on the previous discussion we propose the mediating effect of conflict resolution
styles on the relationship between frequency and importance of contact and problems
faced by peacekeepers in their interaction with NGOs.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The relationship between frequency and importance of
contact of Peacekeepers with NGOs and problems that Peacekeepers faced
during their mission will be mediated by their conflict resolution style.

Method and Measures
Our data comes from a sample of Dutch military peacekeepers on missions between 1995
and 1999 in Bosnia (N = 907). The survey was sent to all officers who have been on
peacekeeping missions between 1995-1999, and low ranked officers of military police as
they were trained and have relatively intense contact with parties on the ground. Overall
there are 907 military respondents (over 52% response rate). Additionally, we have 70
non-military expatriates, sent to crisis areas and 50 non-Dutch military from a variety of
western countries. The following paragraphs describe our measures.
Frequency of contact between Peacekeepers and NGOs. This was measured by the
item Contact with NGO on a Likert scale from 1 (hardly ever) to 5 (daily)
Importance of contact between Peacekeepers and NGOs. This was measured by the
item Contact with NGO on a Likert scale from 1(irrelevant) to 5 (very important)
Conflict resolution style. This was measured with the item “how did you in general
manage personal frictions and differences of opinion or interest with others during your
latest mission” on a Likert scale from 1 (never) to 5 (always). Examples of successful
conflict resolution styles included statements such as “ I examined issues until I found a
solution that really satisfied me and the other party” or “I concurred with the other party.”
Unsuccessful conflict resolution was indicated by statements such as “ I pushed my own
point of view” or “I searched for gains”
Problems. This was measured by the item “How frequently did you face problems
between your peacekeeping team and NGOs” broken down by frequency (on a scale 1 –
harldy ever to 5 daily), seriousness (on a scale from 1-not at all serious to 5 –very
serious) and personal involvement (one a scale from 1-not at all to 5- heavily involved).

Perception of preparedness. This was measured by six items. An example of the items
used are: “Did you have enough time to prepare yourself for the missions?” measured on
a scale of not at all to more that enough and “Were your training and preparation
adequate?” measured from not at all to more than enough.
Training. We used two items. First, “looking back at the training for your latest mission,
how important to you find knowledge and skills in the following subjects and how do you
evaluate the possible training?” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 10 (absolutely yes). And
second, “Are there any other subjects you have missed during preparation for your
peacekeeping mission” (no or yes, what subjects?)
Results
We run t-tests to see whether there is a significant difference between peacekeepers who
identified themselves as well-prepared and fully trained versus those who did not. We
also run hierarchical regressions to test the moderating effect of training on the
relationship between frequency of contact and conflict resolution style. Our results show
that there is a significant difference between peacekeepers who identified themselves as
well-prepared and fully trained versus those who did not. In particular, peacekeepers who
had frequent and important contact with NGOs are likely to find mutually satisfactory
solutions or compromise solutions. To be continued!!!
Discussion
Implications for peacekeeping/NGO relations in future conflict and post-conflict
interventions. To be continued!!!
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